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CHAPTER I
Introduction
Television news is undoubtedly one of the major sources
of news and information for many Americans.

Recent trends

in the television news industry all indicate that television
will continue to be such a major source of news in the years
to come.

One such trend has been the lengthening by some

stations of their local newscasts, ·with many more stations
co~templating

such a move.

Network television also is con-

sidering the lengthening of its newscasts and is enjoying
the rising popularity of its "news magazines" such as CBS's

"60 Minutes".
Many researchers have examined the role of television
as a major source of news, and some have studied the impact
of television news on society.

Still others have concen-

trated on detailed analysis of television news coverage
of significant events.

The present study is designed to

expand on · this existing knowledge by

observi~g

and analyzing

network television news coverage of a significant and recent
international event, namely the Iranian hostage crisis (1979-

19 81) .
The Iranian hostage crisis, which dominated the international scene for over a year, began on November 4, 1979,
when several hundred Iranian "militant students" attacked
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the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran, taking sixty-six pe rsonnel and nonpersonnel 0ostage.

The militants, who were

later supported by the Iranian revolutionary government,
primarily demanded the return of the former Shah of Iran
(Mohamad Reza Pahlavi), to be tried for alleged crimes and
corruptions committed during his thirty-seven years of
ruling Iran.

The Shah had been admitted to a New York hos-

pital for "medical treatment" several days prior to the date
the hostages were taken.

Several captives were released

during the first few days of the crisis, whereas the last
fifty-two Americans were freed from ·Iran, after

444 days in

captivity, on January 20, 1981, moments after Ronald Reagan
had been sworn in as the fortieth president of the United
States.
Background and Related Material
In order to study television news coverage (of foreign
events), one has to examine several aspects of television
news.

The following questions are posed and an attempt will

be made to deal with each in this chapter:

1.

How much does the American public rely on televi-

sion for news?
'

'

2.

Can television news influence the public?

3.

Can the American government influence television

4.

How has television news performed in the covering

'

news?

pf past foreign events?

5.

Has television news been objective or free of bias
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in the past?
1.

How much does the American public rely on tele-

vision for news?

A great deal.

It is estimated that every

we eknight some 25 to 30 million American households, that
is approximately 65 to 70 million people, watch

~ne

of the

three network television news programs (Altheide, 1976;
Pearce, 1980).

.

.

According to a report by Television Informa-

tion Office (Roper, 1980), a sizeable majority of the American public continues to get most of its news from television (64% as of November 1976) which has led all media
since 1963.

Roper further found that, since 1961, televi-

sian has led · as the most believable news medium in the eyes
of the American public.
In terms of overall television viewing (in which news
is included) Reel (1979) points out that adults spend approximately 28% of their leisure time watching TV, and that
sixty million sets are on for an average of six hours a day.
Reel speculates that by the time a child reaches school,
he will have watched television for more hours than he will
ever spend in college classrooms.
that by the time the child is

Reel further indicates

e~ghteen,

he will have devoted

one-sixth · of his life to television viewing.
Thus, one may conclude that the American public is fond
of television and tends to rely heavily on it for news.
2.

Can television news influence the public?

Schil-

ler (1973 ) believes this is so and explains:
America's media managers create, process, refine, and

preside over the circulation of images and informatio n
which determine our beliefs and attitudes and, ultimately, our behavior. When they deliberately produce
messages that do not correspond to the realities of
social existence, the media managers become mind managers. ( p. 1)
Although Schiller is referring to mass media in general, the
assumption could be made that he has television in mind as
well.
Further argument for television news influence on the
public comes from Reel (1979):
The real problem posed by network control over the
broadcasting of the news ... is not avarice.
It is the
power, the potential to influence people's minds and
actions, that is most troublesome.
It is a disturbing
fact that today most Americans do not read newspapers $
Sixty percent of all Americans .depend solely on television for their news. (pp. 92-93)
Some authors/researchers have used specific examples

to explain how television news can influence the public
opinion.

For example, Kuhns (1970), regarding the 1968

Chicago convention, writes:
Indeed the very extent of aggravation and ho.stility
that the televi~ion netwo~ks aroused proves, as much
as the moon landing a year later, the fantastic power
and influence of the medium. (p. 49)
One cannot discuss the infltience of television ·news
on the public without mentioning the television coverage of
President John F. Kennedy's assassination in 1963.
·· ,

boo~

on this subject, Mayo (1967)

In a

wr~tes:

The continuous newscast o~ the assassination and funeral of . President John F. Kennedy and the . succession
to the presidency by Lyndon B. ·Johnson, was an unprece4ented psy9hological, political and journalistic
event. ( p. 5)
Mayo further indicates that "television gave the griev-
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ing nation a comforting sense of continuity and of national
survival" (p. 5).

Greenberg and Parker (1965) make similar

observations and note that:
The communication channels reassured people that the
functions of government were being carried on smoothly,
that there was no conspiracy, and that there was no
further threat.
If the content of the consequent communication had not been so reassuring, fear and anxiety
might have magnified to the point of hysteria. (p. 382)
It appears that mass media, especially television,
played a very important role of reassuring the public.

It

is perhaps ironic that television news gave one of its finest
and most influential performances while covering the death
of a president.
Zucker (1978) studied the influence of network television news on public opinion in the areas of pollution,
drug abuse, energy, unemployment, and the cost of living in
the period of 1968 to 1976.

The author found that network

television news reports had altered the viewers' perception
in the areas of pollution, drug abuse and energy.
In another example of influence of television news
(this time on the policy of the U.S government regarding the
Vietnam War) Shaw (1979) explains how Walter Cronkite became opposed to the war and this prompted President Johnson
to tell his press secretary that it was a turning point,
that if he had l o st Walter, he had lost Mr. Average Citizen.
Shaw further quotes author David Halberstam as saying, "It
was the first time · in American history a war had been declared over by an anchorman " ( p. 42).
In order to broaden the perspective, it is perhaps
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helpful to note the thoughts of a Soviet journali s t on the
Republican National Convention of 1980:
It was a perfect television show.
In fact, it was
for television that the convention was primarily intended.
This may seem an exaggeration, but the three
giant TV networks--which determine not only public
opinion in America but also, to a large extent, the
country's policy--did more than produce a gigantic show.
They essentially directed the convention.
(Kobysh,

1980, p. 57)
There are of course different ways in which television
news can influence public opinion.
the coverage of a specific issue.

One way is by prolonging
This is perhaps due to

the fact that one of the most important factors affecting
recall has been found to be the length of time a story appears on the air (Stauffer, Frost and Rybolt, 1978).

This

has also been indicated by McClure and Patterson (1976) who
reported cases in which television news, through intensive
coverage, played a role in increasing the salience of issues
on the audience's mind (like coverage of Nixon's trip to
China in 1972).
Another way television news can exert its influence is
by manipulating masses and by propagandizing.

Addressing

mass media in general, Cirino (1971) · writes:
Even though it appears obvious that the ·use of propaganda has considerable effect on public attitudes
and behavior, the owners of media are still able to
minimize its importance because it is extremely difficult to prove scientifically the exact effect of
attempts to influence public opinion. (p. 184)
Cirino further argues that, in the broadest sense, "All
the people of the world are in a state of being propagandized by the very technical and financial nature of modern
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communication" (p. 200).
Another attempt to explain the manipulative power of
mass media was made by Wells (1972):
Since the media are invariably · controlled by a small
group of people, be they government personnel or private operators, they always have a manipulative potential.
Indeed, by the necessary selection of information to be transmitted, no matter how carefully this
selection is made, there is always a slant given to
the reportage of human events.
So the problem of manipulation is a matter of degree. (pp. 73-74)
Recently, in 1979, Reel discussed the problem in another form:
The potential for manipulation and control of public
opinion that now exists in the offices of American networks is without question, beyond any preexisting private power in our history. (p. 93)
In summation, it appears that television news is believed to have the potential to influence public opinion
and may be used to manipulate the masses.

3.

Can the American government influence television

news reporting?

The question of government influence on

television news has always haunted the television industry.
It is significant to note that in many other countries of
the world, television and other major media are controlled
by their respective governments.

This, however, is not the

case in the United States, even though the FCC has regulatory
power over the broadcast industry.

This section first deals

with the nonregulatory influence of government on television
news and then discussion will be afforded to ·the regulatory
power of the government over television news.
Lowry (1971) studied the possibility of the administra-
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tion influencing the network television news.

Through a

content analysis, the author found the three networks'
news reporting had been influenced by the administration (of
President Nixon).
Skornia (1968) discusses the kind of influence, on
media in general, which is brought by censorship:
There is, no doubt, too much government censorship,
particularly by the military.
Any such censorship is
too much in peacetime. · All journalists should oppose
managed news, and should fight for access to all materials which do not genuinely jeopardize our national
security. (p. 82)
In an article discussing how the members of Congress
can benefit from the news media,

Ba~dikian

(1974) writes:

Most of the media are willing conduits for the highly
selective information the member of Congress decides
to feed the electorate.
This propaganda is sent to
newspapers and broadcasting stations, and the vast
majority of them pass it off to the voters as professionally collected, written and edited "news". (p. 4)
In an article discussing the manner in which President
Carter tried to shape the news, Leubsdorf (1978) explains
that the president made an announcement of a $100 million
pledge for solar energy on Sun Day, shortly before the deadline for the networks' evening news.

Since the networks did

not have enough time to check t0e details, they went ahead
with the story of the pledge; only to find later that the
pledge had not really been new and had been a part of a
package already in the making.

Leubsdorf suggests:

What had happened was an exc~llent example of the ability of any U.S president to "make news" and control the
way it is disseminated.
It is a problem most White
House correspondents recognize, but one which they often
feel virtually helpless to deal with, especially when
the events happen close to deadline. (p. 42)
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The story was, of course, later corrected but it was
too lat e and it had already made the impact the pr e side nt
had s o u g ht.

Leubsdorf explains how:

While a number of these stories provided at least s ome
context for the pledge story, most of the nation's
vi e we r s and readers never got to the fine print, e s p e cially since most, presumably, perceived the eve n t
as it wa s presented by the three networks and the tw o
major wire services.
The net impact was precisely the
one the White House intended: A belief . that the president h ad made an important new commitment to solar
energy on Sun Day.
And the incident demonstrated once
more the tremendous advantage any White House has over
the presidential press corps. (p. 43)
F inally, Reel (1 979) tells a story of television news
indus try's sensitivity to government reaction:
Pe rhaps the most dramatic example of the television
industry's sensitivity to government reaction occurred
while Lyndon Johnson was president. Johnson had had a
s p eech prepared by his assistant, Joseph Califano, in
which the term public airwaves had appeared.
President
Johnson penciled in 's after the word public, so that
it now read "public'sairwaves". The next day Califano
was besiege d by all the major broadcast lobbyists, who
wanted to know whether this change signified some dangerous new anti-industry policy in the executive office.
(p.

102)

Although the nonregulatory influence of government has
been greatly debated, the regulatory power of government has
been debated just as much, if not more.

The basic law which

gives the .government its authority of control over broadcasting is the Communications Act of 1934.

The Federal Com-

munications Commission (FCC) is the government agency charged
with watching over the broadcasters.
Of the provisional regulations that relate to the television news, the Fairness Doctrine and the equal time provision of Section 315 of the Communications Act are most
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debated.

The Fairness Doctrine applies to the broadcasters'

obligation to be balanced and fair in their news coverage
and public affair programming.

The equal time provision,

however, applies specifically to the treatment of political
candidates and to the broadGasters' obligations to make time
available to all qualified candidates . (Diamond, 1978).
The Fairness Doctrine and the equal time provision have
brought negative reactions from the broadcasters and the
professionals in the field.

One such reaction comes from

Hofstetter and Buss (1978) who note tha~:
The Fairness Doctrine, for instance, requires mention
of more than one view concerning issues. Depth in coverage may be sacrificed by giving several groups time
or space with regard to some issue.
Resulting superficial coverage provides less information even if the
in-depth coverage were less balanced. (p. 525)
Schoenbrun (1976), a long-time media professional, has
the following thought:
The question of equal time has made stations
vous that they are fearful about giving time
candidate.
But that is not the worst of it.
years the equal time provision has grown and
like a cancer throughout the entire American
(p.

so nerto any
Over the
spread
media.

78)

Criticism comes also from Congressional Representative
VanDeerlih (1977) who observed that "Existing communications
..

'

law is far more a hindrance than help to the news professional on teievision and radio ." (p. 41).
Finally; a study by Busby (1979) surveyed the attitudes
of broadcast station managers on regulations and found that
the broadcasters, from major and small

markets~

believe that:

Regulations have drastically increased in the last ten
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years and with the increase in regulations their jobs
have become harder and their expenses have greatly increased.
They are pessimistic about the future of
broadcasting and about the future of regulations.
(p.

340)

Thus, in conclusion of this section, it appears that
the American government (and its agencies) do have some r e gulatory and nonregulatory influence over the network's television news and there have been cases in the past where the
government has used this influence.

4.

How has television news performed in its covering

of past foreign events?

Before attempting to find the

answers to this question, it is significant to note that in
covering foreign events or crises, some problems exist, not
necessarily from the fault of television news but from the
way world politics operate.

Some .examples should clear the

point.
One such problem, and perhaps an important one, is the
fact that (international) censorship exists in many parts
of the world.

Some foreign leaders exert pressure on the

correspondents for favorable coverage.

Foreign leaders

could also limit the reporters' access to sources or · areas
of information.

A favorable coverage could be obtained by

foreign leaders' generous gifts to reporters.

A somewhat

militant approach used by a foreign leader is desrcibed by
Rubin (1975):
This June (1975), Uganda's president Idi Amin threatened to execute British subject Denis Hills for passages
critical of Amin in an unpublished manuscript confiscat ed by Ugandan police.
Amin made a number of demands
before unconditionally releasing Hills--among others,
that the British government stop the BBC from spreading
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"malicious propaganda" against Uganda and the British
press from publishing "wild and baseless" reports that
Uganda was in a state of chaos. (p. 55)
Another problem with covering foreign events (and to a
oegree domestic events as well) is the fact that there are
some four billion people in the world and no establishment
can even think about covering the affairs of this fourbillion population (mainly due to economic ·and man-power
limitations).

A result of this would be missing out on an

important event that is in the making.

This is further ex-

plained by Critchfield (1978):
Three-fourths of the world's people receive very little
attention from American reporters.
They are the peasants, the three billion. people who are still traditional subsistence cultivators of the land.
There should
be no doubt that these people are worth our attention:
all the major contemporary revolutions--in Mexico, Russia, China, Indochina, Egypt, Algeria, Cuba, Angola-have involved peasant societies.
In almost every case
the revolution was preceded by cultural breakdown out
in the villages, because the old peasant ways and views
of life no longer worked. (p. 32)
The above-mentioned difficulties relating to the covering of foreign events should be kept in mind while evaluating television news performance in covering of those
events.
Perhaps the best way to study the foreign coverage
would be to examine some of the significant foreign events
and their coverage in the past two decades:
l.

Nigeria and the Civil War (of late 1960's): Sambe

(1980) studied the American network television coverage of
the civil war in Nigeria.

He found, through a content anal-

ysis, that the three commercial networks used inferences and
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judgments in covering the crisis.

Sambe also found out

that the networks tended. to be favorable to Biafra's cause
and unfavorable to Nigeria's.
Balogun (1973), a Nigerian, feels that the Western
media fell victim to Biafra's propaganda campaign.

He ex-

plains:
Near-total ignorance of Africa and Nigeria on the part
of most of the European and American journalists covering the Nigerian Civil War made them willing to accept
even ~he most fantastic propaganda handouts at face value and precluded any deep analysis of the genesis
and circumstances of the conflict. (p. 94)
Balogun further explains why the media were more favarable to Biafra:
Pressure from powerful financial and economic interests
which stood to benefit by Nigeria's disintegration
played a leading role in determining the stand of the
Western news media. (p. 95)
Okpaku (1972), presumably an African, is also critical
of Nigerian coverage and attributes the poor coverage to reporters' lack of knowledge and background on Nigeria.

He

suggests:
It has never occurred to those who run the bastions
of international communications, such as the Associated
Press, United Press International, The New York· Times,
or the television networks, to · employ the services of
African reporters in order to provide their public with
more knowledgeable information and more sophisticated
and more sensitive interpretation of the dynamics of a
situation the Africans are more aquainted with. (p. 4)
Finally, Rothmyer (1970) also criticizes the Nigerian
coverage and believes that "The further away geographically
the story occurs, the more likely it is that special-interest groups will be successful in influencing its telling"

(p . 47).

14
2.

Chile (in the 1960's):

Some experts have criti-

cized the media's (including television's) coverage of Chile
and the American government's involvement in that country.
Robert Schakne (1976), a CBS correspondent, who covered
Chile, explains the situation rather clearly:
The facts were indisputably newsworthy and headlinemaking.
As the Senate Intelligence Committee reported it, the United States, over a ten-year period, as a
matter of conscious policy actively interfered in the
domestic politics of Chile, financing one election campaign, promoting at least one coup d'etat attempt, covertly financing opposition newspapers and political
parties, overtly and covertly conducting an economic
warfare campaign to "destabilize" a constitutional
government, and "laying the seeds", as a C. I .A. official
put it, for the successful coup d'etat that finally did
take place ... but for all its news value, this was a
story that went largely unreported, in print or on the
air, while the events in question were taking place.
This was a story left untold until C.I.A. officials
confessed their role to a congressional committee and
Representative Michael Harrington, in turn, made that
testimony public; by then it was testimony about a fait
accompli, a year after the Allende government had been
overthrown. (p. 60)
Morris, Mueller and Jelin (1974) also are critiqal or ·
Chilean coverage by television (and other media).

They ex-

plain what was missing from the coverage:
Among the important missing perspectives in the .coverage of Chile was the extraordinary record of what the
United States Government was doing to the Allende regime~
The assumption of Washington'~ official tolerance was an early and persistent theme in the journalism on Chile.
Most often the subject of American palley was simply ignored. · (p. 21)
Morris et al. further suggest:
And in much of the coverage there was a one-sided
characterization of Allen~e and his government that
obscured both developments in Chile and the reality
of U.S policy toward that country.
The reporting of
Allende's Chile leaves disturbing questions about the
depth and range of foreign news coverage, about working
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re ~ a tionshi p s

of correspondents to the U.S gov ernme nt ~
and, not least, about the imp a ct of culture a n d i d eo logy on the efforts of a free p ress to .report in te rnational affairs. (p. 16)

3.

Vietnam War (of late 1960's and early 1970's):

The

coverage of the Vietnam War has brought criticism to te l evi s ion and other media as well.

It has been argued that t h e

medi a either missed the real story, as they did in Chile, or
c h ose not to tell it. Reel (1979) explains how:
The networks boast that they brought the Vietnam War
i nto our living rooms, but there is reason to believe
t hat what they brought was largely a fiction.
What
we saw was what Michael Arlen describes as a "parade
of film clips of guns firing and of smoke rising and
of refugees fleeing", a collection of images that
smacked of thoughtlessness.
Over a period of ten long
years, television failed to tell us the major story
of our times, the truth behind the tragic venture into
Southeast Asia and all that it might portend for our
count r y . ( p . 1 0 2 )
Friendly (1970-1971), former president of CBS News,
feels that television and o t her media did not succeed in explaining the Vi e tnam War.

He suggests that "Brilliant combat

reporting has not been enough, or Vietnam would not continue
to be the best reported and least understood war in history"
(p. 19).

Bailey (1976) examined the coverage of the Vietnam War
and found that:
The network anchormen, in their daily summaries of the
war, read short stories of events with~ut much interpretation, certainly without challenging, adversary
interpretation. (p. 323)
In summary then, a review of expert analysis on television news coverage of some of the most important events o f
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recent history (the Nigerian Civil War, the Chilean affa ir,
and the Vietnam War) indicates that television and other
media were not wholly successful in telling the real stories.

5.

Has television news been objective in the past?

The question of objectivity or unbiased reporting is a very
controversial one.

Experts have presented opposing view-

points in this regard.

This is perhaps due· to the fact that

it is difficult to define the terms in question.

One of the

most recent efforts to define bias was made by Stevenson and
Greene (1980) who concluded that:
What news consumers see as biased news is often material which is discrepant with the information already in their heads, material which evokes an evaluative response.
If so, news bias is less a function of
reporters' accuracy or fairness and more a function of
what readers and viewers think the situation is or
ought to be. (p. 121)
It appears that a majority of bias allegations occurs
when the news organization is covering a story with competing elements or characters, such as an election, a war, or
a riot.

These are the cases where the media may be charged

with biased reporting or favoring one side over another.
For example, Sambe (1980), in an analysis of the television news coverage of the Nigerian Civil War, found that
the three commercial networks were favoring one side (Biafra)
over the other (Nigeria ) .
In anot0er case, Efron ( 1971), in her book The News
Twisters, studied the coverage of the commercial networks
during the 1968 presidential electioris.

Efron concluded ·
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that the campaign coverage of the three networks was heavily
biased against Richard Nixon.

However, later studies dis-

credited much of Efron's findings and her methodology.
For example, in a replication of Efron's study, Stevenson, Eisinger, Feinberg and Kotok (1973) were led to a totally different conclusion:
There was no evidence of any systematic evaluative bias
for or against any of the three candidates.
Coverage
of all three candidates· was remarkably similar.
(p. 219)
Thus a review of opinions and findings on the issue of
objectivity indicates that there have been cases where television news has been biased, at least to a degree.
Summary.

A brief summary of related research would then

indicate that:
1.

The American public tends to rely heavily on tele-

vision for news.
2.

Television news has been found capable of influ- ·

encing the public opinion.

3.

The American government has been found capable of

influencing the television news.

4.

Television news has had some difficulty in cover-

ing some of the most important international events of recent history.

5.

Television news has been found to be biased at

times, although not necessarily deliberately, in its reporting.
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Purpose of the Study
As the review of the literature showed, researdh has
bee n directed at studying of television news and its effects
on society.

Similarly, research has evaluated the perfor-

mance of television news in covering specific events. Nearly
all major events covered by television news have been the
target of one or more scientific inquiries.

What follows

appears to be one of the first scientific attempts to study
and evaluate network television news coverage of the muchpublicized Iranian hostage crisis (1979-1981).

It is the

purpose of this study to carry out such an evaluation,
through scientific means, in order to contribute to an understanding of the performance of the network television
news.
Significance of the Study
Television played a very unique role in the Iranian
hostage crisis due to several reasons.

One, television

was used for transmission of messages between the governments
of the United States and Iran since direct communication between the two governments was made. difficult by severed
diplomatic relations.
..

Two, the Iranian government tried to

gain American public support for its cause through American
'

mass media, especially television.

Three, the American

government also utilized the mass media to counter such efforts by the Iranian government.

Four, the American mass

media, most notably television, gave an extensive amount of
coverage to the crisis.
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Since television played such a significant role in t h e
crisis, much research is likely to surface in the near future, and it will examine how well television covered the
crisis.

What has already surfaced have been judgmental eval-

uations and reactions to the coverage rather than scientific
inquiries.

For example, Said (1980) wrote a lengthy article

criticizing the media coverage of Iran.

His contention is

that media mainly presented the crisis as the U.S government
saw it.

Thus Said suggests that:

For a journalist, blindly serving his government is as
perilous as assuming that his audience is incapable of
learning.
Neither course is acceptable for a society
like ours, and no amount of going on about free competition, openness, and democracy ought to obscure the
issues.
Bad journalism is bad journalism, but for the
U.S it is worse. (p. 33)
Said further argues that the media were generally
closed-minded in covering the Iranian crisis.

He explains:

It is alarming that the U.S press seems generally incapable of learning much about the world, that its
reports one day seem not to have incorporated very
much learned the day before, that it seems generally
unwilling to refine its perceptions by looking in new
places. (p. 33)
Hurewitz (1980), a specialist on the Middle East,
agrees (with Said), with some "reservations", with the notion
that "Cove·r age of the late fall and winter 1979-1980 phase
of the crisis in United States relations with Iran was
flawed" (p. 19).
It is important to note that Said is referring to the
coverage which began with the Iranian revolution (1978-

1979).

The author's contention is that the media's misunder-

standing and misrepresentation of the revolution (partly)
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contributed to the (misunderstanding of the) hostage crisis.
Bordewich (1980) has views similar to Said's:
We have misunderstood not just the Iranian revolution,
but revolution itself.
We have misunderstood fascism.
We have misunderstood the implications of modernization.
In a sense, we have been our own captives in
Iran, held hostage by our ethnocentrism, the inabi l ity
to see anything in an alien culture but our own re fl ection. (p. 71)
Hodding Carter, the State Department's spokesman during
much of the crisis, has the following reservation about the
Iranian coverage:
Someday, somebody's going to do a piece on how much of
policy and coverage was actually based on any kind of
understanding of the dynamics at play in Iran.
I'm
talking about the critics as well as the policymakers
and all forms of press.
The basic underlying realities
of what was going on in Iran were ignored. (VanHoffman,
1980, p. 37)
Thus it appears that even though no scientific research
has yet been reported on the coverage of the Iranian hostage
crisis, some negative reactions have already surfaced.

An .

in-depth scientific a n alysis of the network television news
coverage of the hostage crisis should then constitute a significant step forward in the understanding of television
news and its performance in reporting developments with significant international consequences.

CHAPTER II
Methodology
On e way to evaluate the network's television news coverage of the Iranian hostage crisis would be to determine
whether the networks reported the event objectively and free
of bias.

To do this, a definition of "bias in the news"

needs to be utilized.

It is, however, apparent that re-

searchers have had difficulty in agre eing on standard definitions for bias.

For example, Stevenson and Greene (1980)

note that "Bias is hard to define, but many find it easy to
recognize in their newspapers and newscasts" (p. 115).
One fairly common approach defines bias as "The systematic

differen~ial

treatment of one candidate, one party)

one side, of an issue over an extended period of time"
(Stevenson and Greene, 1980, p. 116).

Hofstetter (1976) de-

fined bias as "partiality in the news prograrnrning ... lying,
distortion, and aggrandizement of values" (p. 4).
An approach for detecting bias has involved the examination of the language content of the

new~.

This approach

(used by Lowry, 1971; Sambe '· 1980.) fi.rst tries to identify
the statements that are factual compared to statements that
are capable of containing bias ·or partiality.

It then

determines whether the statements that are capable of containing partiality are actually biased or not.

The re-
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searchers who have used this approach refer to the factual
statements as "reports" and the statements that are capable
of being biased are referred to as "inferences" and "judgments".

This approach can be applied to all spoken words

and contends that all sentences (used in the reporting of an
event), regardless of content, are either reportive or inferential, or judgmental.
The above approach to the study of news will be applied
here to evaluate the network's television news coverage of,
and its attitude toward, the Iranian hostage crisis.

The

justifications for using this approach will be explained
later.

First an in-depth definition for each category (of

reports, inferences and judgments) is necessary.
Briefly, report sentences are factual statements made
from observations; inferences are made when the observer
infers a conclusion based on what he observes; and judgments
are those statements that involve some appraisal on the part
of the observer.

Some hypothetical examples should better

explain the concept.

A bystander watches a car weaving as

it goes down the street.

The bystander may comment, "That

car is not going straight".

This would be

a

reportive

(factual) statement since the bystander is reporting only
what he is observing.
drunken

drive~'',

Or he may comment, "Lodk c;tt that

which would be an inferential statement

since he is inferring or guessing from the car's irregular ·
movement that the driver is drunk, whereas something else
might have caused the irregularity.

Or the bystander may
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comment, "That drunk has no respect for others' rights",
which would imply that not only is he making an inference
(that the driver is

drunk)~

the driver's character.

he is also making a judgment on

These examples illustrate that an

individual may observe one occurrence but reach and/or report three different conclusions.

At this point an attempt

will be made to explain reports, inferences. and judgments
still further.
Reports are statements made merely based on observation and are capable of being verified (Hayakawa, 1972).

Of

course some reports may not be easy to verify personally,
such as the height of a mountain or the depth of an ocean,
but ideally it is possible to do so.

Thus, one may rely on

available information on the height of the mountain or the
depth of the ocean with comfort that the information is correct.

Another major characteristic of reports is that they

can be made only after the observation and not before.
Inferences are statements made by guessing, from some
known or observed fact, at some conclusion.

Inferences may

be made at any time, unlike reports, which have to be made
only after observation.

Lee (1962) indicates that, "Any ut-

terance made prior to observation or when observation is not
'

'

'

possible involves an inference or guess" (p. 34).

Haney

(1973), another author who has distinguished between statements of facts (reports) and statements of inferences, ex- ·
plains that inferences can be made at any time and by anyone, can go beyond observation and may involve some degree
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of probability.

More recently, Haney (1979) noted that ,

''We find it enticingly easy to make inferences and to utter
infe rential statements with the false assurance that we are
dea ling with 'facts''' (p. 258).

Of course it is signi fi can t

to note that the point is not to avoid making any inferences
but rather to try to be aware of the inferences made.

It

would be almost impossible to go through a day of life wi thout making so me kind of infarence; and inferences can even
be useful at times.

For example, a fire investigator can

only infer !rom the ruins of a fire as to what caused the
fire.

In a broader sense, science too uses inferences.

For

example, scientists can only infer, from collected data and
previous observation, the expected nature of the cosmos, as
direct observation by man has not yet been possible.
Judgments are statements that contain observers'/reporters' personal opinions on, or approval or disapproval of,
some matter (Hayakawa, 1972).

The example of the individual

who observed the weaving car and said "That drunk has no respect for others' rights" illustrates that the observer shows
his (approval or) disapproval of the occurrence by letting
his opinion be known.
An appropriate summary · foP these three categories would
''

'

be the definitions outlined by Hayakawa (1972), who contends
that all sentences, regardless of content, fall into one of
the following groups:
Reports:

Statements of facts, being capable of verifi-

cation, excluding inferences and judgments.
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Inferences:

Statements about the unknown made on the

basis of the known.
Judgments:

Statements expressing reporters' approval

or disapproval of the occurrences, persons, or objects being
described.
Now the question seems to be how this system of cate- ·
gorization can apply to news reporting.

Whenever a report-

er is covering an event (of· any nature), he· uses

combina~.

tions of words to describe what is happening or what has
happened.

These combinations of words (better known as sen-

tences) are then relayed to the audience or reader while
they contain an impression of the event.

There are differ-

ent ways in which the reporter may combine or select his
words (and thus form his sentences).

The type of sentence

or combination he chooses may be one of three:

(a) he may

report what he has in fact observed which would, according
to earlier definitions, be a reportive or factual statement;
(b) he may infer, from what he has seen or what he is seeing,
a conclusion (that he thinks is factual) which would actually
be an inference; or (c) he may interject his personal opinion
into the matter which would constitute a judgment on his
part.

Of course, it is important to realize that the report-

er does not necessarily go through this selection process
every time; ·and that several factors (including his attitude
toward the event, his motivation, etc.) influence the way
he chooses to report.
Thus, it is appropriate to suggest that the reporter
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(knowingly or not) has one of three types of sentences to
cover an event: a report, an inference, or a judgment.

This

is true for any and all kinds of reporters, including newspaper reporters and broadcast reporters and/or anchormen.
Since the Iranian hostage crisis was an event covered by
the reporters, it is appropriate to contend that the repo rt ers, as explained earlier, had the above three types of sentences at their disposal, to cover what was going on.

And,

given the five conclusions which were evolved from the review of literature (p. 17), it is appropriate to apply this
system of categorization (of reports, inferences and judgments) to find out how the networks (through their reporters and anchorpersons) covered the Iranian hostage crisis;
to find out whether the networks merely reported the (verifiable) facts, or they further inferred from these facts,
or they plugged in their own opinions and judgments into
the coverage.

As a result, the first research question was

formulated as follows:
Were the three commercial television networks more reportive in their coverage of the Iranian crisis or more inferential and judgmental?
As the review of the literature (Chapter 1) showed,
there have been cases where television news has been biased
and has taken sides in some past conflicts (for example,
Sambe, 1980, on the Nigerian

C~vil

War).

Since the Iranian

hostage crisis put the two governments of the United States
and Iran into conflict with each other, it is important to
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find out whether the networks favored either side (the
United States or Iran) in t heir coverage.

In order to do

this, however, some operational definitions for favorable
and unfavorable coverage are needed.

These definitions

should be applicable to the crisis under study and should
have been validated in past research.

Such definitions are

available from Budd, Thorp and Donohew (1967) and have been
used by other researchers (for example, Sambe, 1980) in
studies similar to the present one.
Favorable:

They are:

Statements that reflect social cohesion,

cooperation, political and economical stability, and/or
strength; statements that depict either side as

progr~ssive,

successful, peace-loving, moral, intelligent, lawful, unified,
and/or exercising leadership.
Unfavorable:

Statements that report social conflicts,

disorganization, political and economical instability, and/
or weakness; statements that depict either side as backward,
domineering, immoral, impractical, unlawful, disunified, and/
or lacking leadership.
Neutral:

Any statement that reflects neither favorable

nor unfavorable conditions.

(p. 53)

The above definitions will be used to find out if the
networks favored either side in the Iranian conflict.

Of

course this evaluation is possible only if inferences and
judgments are detected in the c9verage.

This is due to the

fact that report sentences are, by definition, factual representation of events and that if the networks tended to
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favor one side or the other, this would show in, and be c ontained to, their inferences and judgments.

Thus, research

question number two has been designed to discover which side,
if either, the networks tended to favor in their inferences
and judgments, if any such inferences and judgments were
detected:
Did the three networks favor one side (the United
States) or the other (Iran) in their coverage of the crisis?
Finally, since media critics and researchers have
charged that television news does not identify its news
sources in most of the cases (for example, Ryan, 1979), a
third research question was designed to discover what sources
of news and information the networks used in their coverage
of the Iranian crisis (this should add support to, or detract support from, previous research):
What news sources were used most often by the three networks in the coverage of the Iranian crisis?
Procedure
The procedure employed in this study was similar to the
content analysis of Lowry (1971) and Sambe (1980).
of the three commercial networks'

(ABC,

C~S

A sample

and NBC) cover-

age of the Iranian crisis in the evening news programs were
audio-recorded.

The sample consisted of three weeks drawn

at random by selecting one week in April (1980), about five
months into the crisis, and skipping two weeks and selecting another week and so on for the third sample week.

The

sample under study consisted of Monday through Friday (April
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21-25, May 12-16, and June 2-6 of 1980).

Saturdays and Sun-

days were excluded from the study due to the fact that the
networks use different formats and anchors on the weekends.
The main sample coverage consisted of a total of fifteen
days.

The selected weeks appear to have been a fair and

typical representation of the coverage of the crisis due to
the fact that they consisted of one week of. heavy coverage
(as was the case in the beginning) and two weeks of moderate
coverage (which was the case later on in the crisis).
Only stories and reports relating to the Iranian crisis
were selected for analysis.

Any item read by the anchormen,

whether a copy story or an introduction to a filmed report,
was considered to be a story.

The stories had to meet one

or more of the following conditions (established by the researcher for guideline) in order to be selected:
1.

Mentioning the crisis by name.

2.

Mentioning the hostages by name.

3.

Dealing with efforts to free the hostages.

4.

Reporting statements made by officials or private

citizens regarding the hostages.

5.

Dealing with Iran and/or its internal problems.

6.

Dealing with events caused by the crisis, or the

events which would not have been covered had the crisis not
taken place.
The sample under study was analyzed by three independent coders, all American nationals, with ages of 21-25, who
had an average of two years of college education.

The coders
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listened to each sentence in the selected news stories as
many times as they wished with no time limitations.
For research question number one (whether the networks
were more reportive or more inferential and judgmental), the
coders were asked to determine whether each sentence was a
report, an inference, or a judgment.

The three coders were

extensively trained in order to be able to distinguish between the three categories (of reports, inferences and judgments).

As part of their training, the following examples

(some hypothetical, some taken from the news) were used:
Reports.

(a) The president flew to Camp David last

night, (b) the senator was reelected for a second term, (c)
they all had ties on at the reception, (d) she did not attend the congressional hearing, and (e) the congress passed
the budget bill yesterday.
Inferences.

(a) What they really want to do is to es-

tablish a monopoly,

(b) the governor was not smiling because

of the low turnout,

(c) with his ratings so low, he has no

chance, (d) based on the preliminary results, she will be the
next president, and (e) his speech last night set the tone
for his 1984 bid.
Judgments.

(a) This campaign was marvelously organized,

(b) this has to be the saddest day of his presidency, (c) the
hurricane devastated the glory of the beach town, (d) the
exhibition attracted the most sophisticated crowd, and (e)
her extremely harsh criticism will not go unnoticed.
The coders were further instructed to observe the fol-
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lowing rules (so that they would not have to make indi v idu al
evaluative decisions that were inconsistent with each other):
1.

All quotations, direct or indirect, are to be code d

as reports.
2.

If a report sentence contains any element of infer-

ence, it is to be coded as inference.

3.

If a statement contains el e ments of inference and

judgment, it is to be coded as a judgment.

4.

All other sentences/statements are to be coded as

they appear under reports, inferences, or judgments.
For the second research question, which side, if any,
the networks favored more, the three coders were instructed
to decide whether each inferential or judgmental statement,
if any detected, was favorable to Iran (thus unfavorable to
the United States), or unfavorable to Iran (thus favorable
to the United States), or neutral.
To learn what news sources the three television networks used most often (research question number three), the
following seven types of news sources were identified, and
each statement was tabulated accordingly:
1.

U~S

government:

Statements attributed to a U.S

government official.
2.

Iranian government:

Statements attributed to

~n

Iranian government official or the militants holding the
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hostages. 1

3.

American public:

Statements attributed to a member

of the American public.

4.

Iranian public:

Statements attributed to a membe r

of the Iranian public.

5.

Networks' confidential:

Statements attributed to

~

a network's confidential source.

6.

Unidentified or observed:

Statements not attribut-

ed to any source; or the observations made by the reporters
on the scene.

7.

Others:

Statements attributed to any other source

not covered in the above six.
This part of the analysis was done by the researcher
(not the co~ers) due to the fact that it required no evaluation or personal judgment.

1 The two groups (Iranian government offic~als and the
militants) were combined because the Iranian government apparently supported the militants and their position; it was
also expected that the total for both groups would only make
up a small percentage of all the news sources (this was actually supported by the data, Table 3); and, the data later
showed that the two groups were almost equally used as news
sources.

CHAPTER III
Results
A total of 2120 sentences were analyzed.

In the fif-

teen days under study, ABC used 704, CBS used 768 and NBC
used 648 sentences to cover the crisis.

These figures in-

dicate that CBS's coverage was slightly longer than that of
ABC or NBC.

NBC, meanwhile, had the least amount of cover-

age on the crisis.

At this point the results for the three

research questions will be examined:
Research question #1:

Were the three commercial tele-

vision networks more reportive in their coverage of the Ir anian crisis or more inferential and judgmental?
The data showed that the three networks used considerably more report sentences than ·inferences and judgments.
As Table 1, which has the total number of sentences used by
the networks during the three week sample-period, shows, ABC
and NBC had almost equal percentages of reports, inferences
and judgments; whereas · CBS had a slightly higher number of
reports (by almost 7%) than the other two networks.

On the

whole, the three networks, in the fifteen-day period under
study, used a total of 1688 (79.6%) reports, 184 (8.7%) inferences, and 248 (11.7%) judgments.

It can be noted that

the difference between CBS and the other two networks was in
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Table 1
Reports, Inferences and Judgments
Networks
Categories

ABC

CBS

NBC

Total

544

77.3%

645

84.0%

499

77.0%

1688

79.6%

Inferences 63

8.9%

62

8.1%

59

9.1%

184

8.7%

13.8%

61

7.9%

90

13.9%

248

11.7%

Reports

Judgments
Total
Note.

97
704

768

648

2120 100.0%

The numbers are averages from the three coders.
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the number of judgments used.

That is, CBS used fewer judg-

mental statements than ABC or NBC.
The following are some actual examples, from the recordings which judges/coders unanimously agreed to be reports, inferences, and judgments:
Reports:
1.

The mother of an American hostage has been allowed

to see her son.
2.

(ABC)

The State Department today sent telegrams to the

hostage families.

3.

(ABC)

A separate statement dealing with Iran called for

the immediate release of the hostages.

(CBS)

4.

Eight men were killed in that failed rescue attempt.

5.

They spent

6.

The nine common market foreign ministers, meeting

(CBS)

45 minutes together, in private. (NBC)

in Luxembourg, agreed to impose economic sanctions.

(NBC)

Inferences:

1.

It has long been the intention of Ayatollah Khom-

eini's revolution to humiliate the United States.
2.

No further news ... from the compound today.

3.

For the time being, the

conceal its disappointment.

4.

5.

administrat~on

(ABC)

decided to

(CBS)

· Members of congress were just as surprised as

everyone else.

(NBC)

(ABC)

(CBS)

This comes at a time of increasing unrest in Iran.

36
6.
day.

In a land where calm is becoming less common every

(NBC) ·
Judgments:
1.

(Iranian government) which is

struggli~g

to put

down a violent rebellion by many of its own people.

(ABC)

2.

The campus was torn by violence.

(ABC)

3.

Iranian's fragile civilian government clashed to-

day with the powerful clergy in a major test of authority.
(CBS)

4.

Ramsey Clark was under sharp attack.

5.

The Iranians are getting increasingly sensitive

(CBS)

about violence between Moslem fundamentalists and leftists.
(NBC)

6.
Iran.

The audacious attempt to rescue the hostages in

(NBC)
Research question #2:

Did the three networks favor

one side (the United States) or the other (Iran) in their
coverage of the crisis?
The data regarding this question are reported in Table
two, which shows the three-week total for each network as
averaged from the three coders.
It is important to note that the data in Table 2 represent only the inferences and the judgments, not the reports (as expiained earlier).

For instance·, Table 2 shows

that the three networks were neutral in 66.8% of their inferences and judgments.
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Table 2
Favorable, Unfavorable and Neutral

Networks
CBS

ABC

Categories

NBC

Total

Fa

7

4.4%

8

6.6%

14

9.4%

29

6.7%

ub

40

25.2%

31

25.4%

43

28.9%

114

26.5%

Nc

112

70.4%

83

68.0%

92

61.7%

287

66.8%

159
Note.

122

149

430 100.0%

The numbers are averages from the three coders.

aF:

Favorable to Iran/unfavorable to the U.S.

bu:

Unfavorable to Iran/favorable to the U.S.

eN:

Neutral.
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As shown in Table 2, the three networks tended to be
mostly neutral whenever they made inferences or judgments.
In these inferences or judgments, they remained neutral

66.8% of the

time~

while 26.5% of the inferences and judg-

ments were unfavorable to Iran/favorable to the United States
and 6.7% were favorable to Iran/unfavorable to the U.S.

In

other words, the networks favored one side or the other 33%
of the time they made any inferences or judgments.
In comparing the three networks, the data suggest that
ABC and CBS were slightly more neutral than NBC.

· ABC and

CBS were also almost equally unfavorable toward Iran although CBS, at the same time, used slightly more favorable
statements on Iran (2.2%).
Research question #3:

What news sources were used most

often by the three networks in the coverage of the crisis?
The networks, for the majority of the time (52.7%),
either did not identify their sources or conveyed what the
reporters had themselves observed (such as street demonstrations, funerals, etc.).
origin of the sources for the

Table 3 lists the data on the
three-~eek

period.

Further examination of the data shows that all other
sources were used considerably less than the "unidentified"
sources.

The networks however, used U.S government, as

their source of information, 19.6% of the time, whereas
they used the Iranian government only 8% of the time. Another
comparison shows that the networks used the American public,
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Table 3
Sources of News and Information

Networks
Sources

ABC

CBS

NBC

Total

%

U.S government

114

190

111

415

19.6

Iranian government

62

63

44

169

8.0

American public

74

87

100

261

12.3

1

6

8

15

.7

42

4

0

46

2.2

390

395

333

1118

52.7

21

23

52

96

4.5

704

768

648

2120

100.0

Iranian public
Networks' confidential
Unidentified/Observed
Others
Total
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as their source of

information~

they used the Iranian public

12.3% of the time, whereas

.7% of the time.

The three networks proved to be almost identical in
their

select~on

of sources, with the exception of CBS which

received a greater number of its statements from the U.S
government.

(Sambe, 1980, also found that CBS used mostly

State Department sources in its coverage of the Nigerian
Civil War.)
Statistical Analysis
In order to measure the reliability of the three coders
and the degree to which they agreed in their definitions of
the categories involved, a series of chi-square analyses
were administered.
Research question number one asked whether the three
commercial television networks were more reportive in their
coverage of the crisis or more inferential and judgmental.
A chi-square analysis of the data shows that the

code~s/

judges agreed in their definitions of reports, inferences
and judgments during each of the three weeks (Table
chi-square

analysi~

4).

The

shows that differences among the judges

in the use of th.e categories do not exceed the

.30 level of

significance .
..

'

Another chi-square analysis of the data (for the three
weeks total) ori the second research question (whether the
three networks favored one side . or the other in their coverage) shows a chi-square value of

3.70 with 4 degrees of
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Table 4
Chi-square Analysis on Coder Reliability

Week#

Chi-square

Degrees of Freedom

l

4.32a

4

2

1.61

4

3

2.53

4

aP>. 30 (4df)=4.88
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freedom,

(p~.50).

Again, the three coders were in suf-

ficient agreement in their definitions of favorable, unfavorable, and neutral inferences and judgments.
No statistical analysis was necessary on the data for
the third research question (what sources the networks used
most often) since no judgmental evaluation was made in collecting the data.

CHAPTER I V
Summary and Discussion
Previous research has shown that the three comme r ci a l
networks have had some diffi c ulty in covering some of t h e
most important international events of recent history (t h e
Ni g erian Civil War of the late 60's, the Chilean events of
the 60's, and the Vietnam War of the late 60's and the early
70's).

Research has also shown that the netw o rks, at times,

h ave been biased in their news reporting.

Thus a content

analysis was performed to study the network television news
coverag e of the much publici4ed Iranian hostage crisis
(1979-1981).
1.

Three questions were asked:

Were the three television networks more reportive

in their coverage of the crisis or more inferential and
judgmental?
2.

Did the networks tend t6 favor one side or the

other?

3.

What news sources were used most often by the net-

works in their coverage of the crisis?
A total of fifteen days of evening news coverage (three
weeks) from the three commercial networks (ABC, CBS and NBC)
were selected at random.

From _these, stories relating to

the crisis or Iran were further selected and analyzed.
Three independent coders were instructed to categorize ea c h
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news sentence into reports, inferences, or judgments.

The

coders were further instructed to subcategorize inference s
and judgments into statements favorable to Iran/unfavorabl e
to the U.S, unfavorable to Iran/favorable to the U.S, or
neutral . . The third research question was responded to by
(the researcher) classifying each sentence as having come
from one of these sources: U.S government, Iranian government, American public, Iranian public, networks' confidential, unidentified/observed, and finally, others.
The results showed that the three networks were mostly
reportive (8~%) in their coverage of the crisis; they did,
however, use 20% inferences and judgments.

The three net-

works were also slightly more favorable to the American
side (in 26.5% of their inferences and judgments) whereas
only 6.7% of the inferences and judgments they used favored
Iran.

The three networks, however, remained neutral tn

66.8% of their inferential or

j~dgmental

statements.

Source

analyses showed that the networks did not identify their
sources in 52.7% of the cases.

32% of the statements came

from U.S officials or citizens compared with 8.7% coming
from Iranians.

A series of chi-square analyses were adminis-

tered and coder reliability proved to be significantly high
in all cases.
Discussion
In order to evaluate the network television news coverage of a significant and recent foreign (international)
event, namely the Iranian hostage crisis (1979-1981), a sys-
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tematic language approach was employed.

This approach was

designed to help determine whether the networks covered the
crisis objectively (by using factual or reportive sentences)
or if they injected their own (inferences and) judgments into the coverage.

The appropriate contention would be that

the more reports used, the more objective the coverage is
likely to be.

On the other hand, the more inferences and

judgments used, the less objective the coverage is likely
to be.
The content analysis for research question number one
(whether the networks were more reportive or more inferential and judgmental in their coverage of the Iranian crisis)
showed that the three .commercial networks (ABC, CBS and NBC)
used mostly report sentences (80%), while using some inferences and judgments as well (20%).

This indicates that one

out of every five sentences used by the networks in covering the crisis, had some element of inference or judgment
in it.
In lieu of the television news coverage of some other
important foreign events (Chapter 1), one is likely to look
at the findings in this present study and conclude that television did a fairly good job of reporting the Iranian crisis .
..

,

For example, Sambe (1980) used the same language approach
and studied the television news coverage of the civil war
in Nigeria.

Sambe found far mqre inferences and judgments

in the Nigerian coverage (53.4%) than this present study
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found in the Iranian coverage (20%).

This establishes a

significant change (for the better) from the coverage of
Nigeria to the coverage of Iran.

This change could, how-

ever, be partly due to the fact that in this study, all
quotations (direct or indirect) were coded as reports
(whether the quotations contained any inferences or judgments or not) and Sambe does not indicate in his article
whether he did the same with quotations or not.
The reason all quotations, regardless of content, were
coded as reports was that this study was trying to examine
the attitude of the networks and not the attitude of the
sources of information.

If these quotations included any

inferences or judgments, they were made by the sources and
not by the networks.

And if the networks reported any in-

ferential or judgmental statements made by any sources, the
networks still reported factually (because that is what the
sources said and not the networks).
Thus, other than the above possible reservation, the
networks used far fewer inferences and judgments in their
coverage of Iran than they did in their coverage of Nigeria,
which would mean that, in this context of evaluation, the
networks did a better job of reporting the Iranian crisis
than they did in reporting the Nigerian Civil War.
At this point it is necessary to note that the three
coders were instructed to

dist~nguish

report statements

from inferences and judgments and they were not required to
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verify the correctness of the reports.

The reason being

that the reports are assumed to be factual (according to
definition) and verification of reports, if desired, would
require a different study, perhaps a study utilizing methodological approaches of detecting accuracy/inaccuracy in
reporting.

In short, the intention in this study was not

to check the accuracy of reports, but rather to distingui sh
reports from inferences and judgments, in terms of wording
and structure.
On research question number two (whether the networks
favored either side in the Iranian crisis), the data suggest
that the three networks appeared to be mostly neutral in
their presentation of the events surrounding the Iranian
crisis even though previous research has found the networks
to have favored one side or another in some controversial
issues (Chapter 1).

However, on the occasions that the net-

works were not neutral, they were more favorable to the
United States than to Iran.

Perhaps an explanation for this

is that it would be natural for the American networks to
tilt to the American side in times
of. tension or crisis.
.
Another reason could be the fact that the Iranian crisis
evolved around the taking of hostages which is largely looked upon as a terrorist act and vexatious at best.

Beyond

the reasons mentioned, it is difficult, if not impossible,
to speculate on the networks' motivations or intentions.
It is important to note that this study only examined
the inferences and judgments in order to find out which side
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the networks favored more.

The report sentences were ex-

cluded from this part of the analysis since the only time
a report sentence can contain any favorable treatment of
one side (and not be rated as a judgment) is when the reporter makes a quotation (direct or indirect) that is not
neutral.

To evaluate this hypothetical quotation as favor-

able or unfavorable would be again evaluating the source of
the quotation, and not the networks.

As indicated earlier,

this study did not involve in evaluation of the sources,
rather it intended to evaluate the networks' performance.
Evaluation of the sources (and their objectivity) would be
a more appropriate task for studies concentrating on the
selection habits of the networks or the news organizations.
The above reasoning could perhaps explain why Sambe

(1980) found the networks far more favorable to one side
(in the case of Nigeria) than this study found (in the case
of the Iranian crisis).

Sambe included the report sentences

in his analysis of favorable/unfavorable whereas this author
did not consider it appropriate to make such an inclusion of
the report sentences into this part of the analysis (for
reasons explained above).
Finally, on research question number three (which news
. .

'

sources the networks used most often in covering the Iranian
crisis), the data showed that the networks did not identify
their sources of information

53%

agreement with previous research.

of the time.·

This is in

For example, Ryan (1979)

reported that 61.3% of all the sentences he analyzed were
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not attributed to a source.

It is significant to note in

this section that the unidentified sources (53%) included
direct observations b y reporters in this study.

Direct ob-

servations would be, for example, covering of ceremonies.
Obviously, the reporter cannot keep repeating "I see the
crowd" or "I see the president" or "I see the motorcade".
It would perhaps be helpful to separate these direct observations (by reporters) from statements (without any identified sources) in future research.

Finally, some more sug-

gestions follow for future research attempts.
Future Research
Future research might study whole newscasts, rather
than one incident or crisis, to discover how much these
programs use inferences or judgments on the average and
overall.

That is, instead of analyzing the coverage of

one event, research could take the whole news and examine
it across the board.
Fu~ther,

future research might analyze a combination

of nonverbal and vocal cues (along with verbal cues) in
order to assess the coverage.

A comparison may also be made

to find out whether verbal and nonverbal signals of a newscast are consistent with each other or not.
Future research might also analyze a sh9rter crisis (in
terms of time duration) than the Iranian crisis which lasted
I

for over a year.

This approach . could study the entire cov-

erage of a shorter crisis and thus the need for sampling
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would be eliminated.
An attempt may also be made to study 'the crises in
which

(officia~)

sources of information are few or inac-

cessible, to find out if this inaccessibility to official
information would lead to more inferential and judgmental
reporting.
Future studies could also analyze crises in which government control (or lack of it) influences or determines the
flow of information to find out how the news organizations
cover such crises.

Finally, future research may examine

coverage of the crises in which sources of information are
hostile to the news media, to find out how reports are affected by such hostility.
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